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ceptance of the philosophy of religion as a legitimate and thriving subdivision
of philosophy, the existence of the Society of Christian Philosophers, and the
influence of certain of its most respected members who led the way into
theology (many but not all of whom are contributors to the current book).
But another reason must in honesty be mentioned (despite the discomfort
it will cause)-dissatisfaction with the current state of theology. In connection with their professional work, especially in the philosophy of religion,
Christian philosophers occasionally find themselves reading theological texts
from people like Anselm or Aquinas or Calvin or Barth. And it appears that
many Christian philosophers find the work of such thinkers to be more careful, stimulating, and faithful to the Christian tradition than the work of many
contemporary theologians, especially the more radical ones.
One of the dangers of philosophers doing theology, of course, is that their
work will seem naive or uninformed. If Christian philosophers want to continue to address themselves in a convincing way to the Christian community
on theological topics, then I am convinced that they will need to educate
themselves in both the history of doctrine and biblical exegesis. Sound Christian theology simply cannot be done without a firm foundation in both disciplines. Fortunately, the contributors to the current work point the way for
us. Plantinga, Brown, Stump, and others show us how important the first is;
Plantinga (in his brief but excellent discussion of the New Testament basis
for the doctrine of the Trinity) shows us how important the second is.
Where will the movement go from here? I do not know. Will it have any
influence on professional theologians? Will it affect the training of clergy?
Will it reach "the intelligent layperson in the pew"? Again, I do not know. I
do believe, however, that Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement is a book of
such high quality on topics so important that it will be hard to ignore.

The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition, by Colin E. Gunton. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989. pp. xiv + 222. $24.95.
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame.
In recent years there has been a dearth of books in English about the Christian
doctrine of the Atonement. Neither theologians nor philosophers of religion
have been much interested in submitting this doctrine to sustained examination. It is therefore striking that not just one but two books on this topic
appeared in print in 1989. One is a philosophical study by the Nolloth Professor of Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the University of Oxford. l
The other, which is the book under review here, is a theological study by the
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Professor of Christian Doctrine at King's College, University of London. This
may, of course, be mere coincidence, but I am inclined to think it is indicative
of important developments in both philosophy and theology. It seems to me
a manifestation of a revival within both disciplines of serious engagement
with traditional understandings of distinctively Christian doctrines. And perhaps it also augurs well for the prospects of interdisciplinary collaboration
between Christian philosophers and Christian theologians. Certainly there is
much in Gunton's book that will be of interest to Christian philosophers who
wish to discuss the Atonement.
The book's first chapter sets the stage for what follows by arguing that
Christian tradition has suffered "mistranslations" (p. 24) at the hands of
Enlightenment rationalism. Gunton is severely critical of the theological reductionism he finds in the work of Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel; we must
try, he claims, to go beyond and to some extent against these seminal thinkers.
Clearly a strong case can be made for this conclusion, and so it is unfortunate
that Gunton's historical argument often rests on oversimplification or misunderstanding of the views of his opponents. He supposes that the effect of
Kant's work "is a transmogrification of Christianity into its opposite" (p. 7)
because he takes Kant's doctrine of moral autonomy to lead to the conclusion
that we save ourselves. But this oversimplifies matters considerably by neglecting Kant's insistence that we must postulate the assistance of divine grace if we
are to conceive of the practical possibility of moral perfection. 2 And
Schleiermacher is bound to be misunderstood if he is thought of as a rationalist
rather than as a leading figure in the romantic reaction against rationalism.
However, the inadequacies of Gunton's brief introductory foray into the
history of German philosophical and theological thought do not detract from
the interest of his constructive account of the Atonement. The second chapter
is devoted to laying out assumptions about theological method and language
on which that account is based. Gunton argues that "metaphor is a primary
vehicle of human rationality and superior to the pure concept" (p. 39). Citing
with approval Kripke's version of the causal theory of reference, he contends
that metaphors of atonement use religious, legal, commercial and military
language to identify a divine action in which God actively remakes broken
relationships. This is, he concludes, "a causal fixing of reference in the sense
that reference is made to God by means of a narration of historical happenings
and their outcome" (p. 46). The next three chapters explore in some detail
three such metaphors of atonement.
Chapter 3 focuses on the metaphor of the battlefield and the demons.
Christ's atoning work is, metaphorically speaking, a military victory over
demonic forces that hold us in bondage. Gunton insists that the aptness of
this metaphor provides us with no basis for a theory of the Atonement of the
sort advanced by Gustaf Aulen. 3 Yet Gunton himself is implicitly guided by
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theoretical assumptions in interpreting the metaphor. Thus, for example, he
deplores the tendency in the later patristic period "to picture the defeat of the
devil as a kind of deceit, in which the devil, believing that Jesus is merely a
human victim, swallows him, only to be impaled on the hidden hook of his
divinity" (p. 63). Indeed, he appears to be skeptical about the existence of
the devil. The language of demons, he tells us, "is used to express the helplessness of human agents in the face of psychological, social and cosmic
forces in various combinations" (p. 70). These examples serve to illustrate
the general point that the interpretation of metaphor is itself an activity that
is, as philosophers of science are wont to say, theory-laden. In these cases I
find Gunton's theoretical presuppositions congenial, but I think it only fair
to acknowledge that Christians who are committed to the existence of the
devil are likely to find them reductionistic.
In Chapter 4 Gunton discusses what he characterizes as the metaphor of
the justice of God. In terms of language drawn from legal sources, Christ's
suffering and death somehow compensate God for human default on obligations owed to Him and thereby right the cosmic balance. The chapter is
notable for its sympathetic treatment of Anselm's attempt to conceive the
Atonement in terms of the legal category of satisfaction. As in the previous
chapter, theological convictions Gunton brings to the task of interpretation
playa crucial role in determining which uses of legal language are legitimate
and which are not. Like Anselm, he has little use for the notion that Christ
paid a price to ransom sinners from the devil. He rejects the idea that the
devil "had obtained, as a result of the Fall, certain rights over humankind,
either on his own account or by divine permission" (p. 87), and he considers
it a mistake to take literally the allusion to ransom at Mark 10:45 by "treating
the blood as an actual price and asking whether it was paid to God or to the
devil" (p. 88). But he also faults Anselm for concentrating too exclusively
on sin as offense and salvation as remission of penalty and rejects the anthropomorphic picture of God as "a rather testy monarch punishing offences
against his personal honor" (p. 95).
Chapter 5 develops the metaphor of Christ as sacrifice, which Gunton
supposes we will find problematic. Roughly put, the problem is that either
sacrifice is a dead metaphor, in which case it cannot be used to cast light on
Christ's work, or it is not, in which case it suggests the revolting idea that
God demands the blood of an innocent victim. Gunton's solution, which is
indebted to the work of anthropologists such as Mary Douglas, involves
subsuming sin under the rubric of uncleanness or pollution and understanding
sacrifice in "its function in the removal of the uncleanness which pollutes the
good creation" (p. 119). There is, however, reason to doubt that the proposed
solution will work. Because the sacrifice in question involves Christ's suffering and death, those who are revolted by the very idea of blood sacrifice
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can hardly be expected to take comfort from the thought that this sacrifice
functions as an antidote to pollution.
Gunton devotes the penultimate chapter of the book to weaving together
the metaphors of victory, justice and sacrifice into a larger tapestry. According
to Gunton, the pattern that emerges exhibits Christ not merely as an example
to us or our representative but also as a substitute for us, doing for us what
we cannot do for ourselves. "That includes," Gunton insists, "undergoing the
judgement of God, because were we to undergo it without him, it would mean
our destruction" (p. 165). And the book concludes with a chapter in which
Gunton makes a number of thoughtful suggestions about how the metaphors
of atonement he favors might be embodied in and inform "a concrete community of language and life" (p. 177).
It seems to me that Gunton is right to suppose that our best hope for
deepening our understanding of the mystery of the Atonement is to try to
weave together into a coherent pattern various strands of Christian reflection
on the subject. Scripture provides us with several motifs to serve as starting
points, and Christian tradition is rich with developments and elaborations of
the scriptural suggestions. Indeed, tradition yields an embarrassment of
riches, for many combinations and permutations of themes are possible. How
are we to decide which of them to prefer? This methodological question is
urgent because Gunton is not the first to attempt to synthesize several of the
traditional motifs. Though the book does not comment on this fact, Aquinas
had earlier employed the strategy Gunton favors. 4 The pattern Aquinas
weaves is interesting both for its similarities to and for its differences from
the one that emerges from Gunton's endeavors. The two of them agree in
regarding the themes of satisfying demands of divine justice and sacrifice as
central to a full account of the Atonement. Unlike Gunton, however, Aquinas
does not highlight the military motif of battle and victory, but he does hold
that humans are literally subject to the devil's bondage on account of sin and
even insists that the price of ransom has to be paid not to the devil but to
God. And many Christians who would have no qualms about going against
the seminal thinkers of the Enlightenment would consider it sheer folly to do
the same with respect to Aquinas. So we must engage in the comparative
evaluation of the merits of several tapestries woven from strands of Christian
reflection on the significance of the life and death of Christ.
It is at this point that I think the appeal to theoretical considerations and
supporting philosophical arguments becomes inevitable, and it is at this point
that Gunton's book disappoints the philosophically inclined reader. It does a
good job of expressing the theological opinions that underlie its judgments
about which metaphors are apt and which are not, but it does precious little
to argue for their superiority to the available alternatives within Christian
tradition. Is Aquinas's belief in the devil a vestige of a now unacceptable
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mythological way of thought? Or does Gunton's skepticism about the devil
represent a mistaken concession to the prejudices of secular modernity?
Whether the position this book sketches out can be developed into an account
of the Atonement that satisfies standards of theoretical justification appropriate for theology and philosophy is a question that stands in need of further
discussion. Perhaps the conduct of such a discussion could be an opportunity
for fruitful collaboration between philosophers and theologians.

NOTES
1. Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
2. For discussion, see Allen W. Wood, Kant s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 232-48.
3. Gustaf Aulen, Christus Metor, tr. A. G. Herbert (New York: Macmillan, 1969).
4. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Pt. III, q. 48, aa. 2, 3 and 4.

